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I. INTRODUCTION

With the adoption of the 1849 Constitution, California affirmed the
continuation of Spanish-Mexican community property principles and expressly
rejected the common law doctrines of dower and curtesy.1 What distinguishes
the community property system from the common law is the community
* Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. My deepest gratitude and
appreciation to colleagues and friends: Professor Michael Zamperini, Professor Marc Greenberg, and
Professor Janice Kosel. Without their support, comments, and encouragement, this article could not have
been completed. And of course, my thanks to my family for their patience, understanding, and unconditional
love throughout my research and writing.
1. Act of Apr. 17, 1850, ch. 105, Calif. Stats 1849-50, 294.
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property system's retention of separate property interests for property acquired
before marriage, property acquired by gifts, and the use of equal shared
ownership for property acquired during the marriage.2 Today, California is
one of nine community property states, but the state stands alone in its
classification and treatment of personal injury damages. The eight other
community property states classify personal injury damages according to the
replacement purpose of each component part.4 For example, compensation for
earnings lost during the marriage is classified as community property, but
compensation for earnings lost after divorce or death is classified as separate
property of the injured spouse. s California is the only state that rejects this
replacement analysis and, instead, follows a unitary approach classifying
personal injury damages in toto. 6 Personal injury monies are treated as either
community property or separate property depending on two factors: (1) when
the cause of action arose, and (2) if the parties divorce.7 The California statute
death; the
is silent as to the classification and disposition of such monies at
8
default.
by
property
community
as
monies
these
statute classifies
This Article addresses the various problems that arise from this
convoluted scheme of classification and treatment. By classifying all personal
injury proceeds as community property during marriage, the California
legislature failed to consider the nature of personal injury damages as
replacement compensation for both economic damages, such as past lost
wages, future lost wages, lost earning capacity, medical expenses, as well as

2. See Michael Diehl, The Trust in MaritalLaw: Divisibility of a Beneficiary Spouse's Interests on
Divorce, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 1301, 1310-11 (1986).

The two pertinent distinguishing characteristics of the community property tradition remain, first,
the retention of individual ownership rights by each spouse and, second, both spouses' shared title
in property acquired during marriage. Two forms of property existed: (1) the separate assets of
each spouse, acquired before marriage, or during marriage by gift or inheritance; and
(2) community property, acquired during marriage, usually involving the exchange of effort or
other consideration traceable to and arising out of the time of the marriage.

Id.
3. Id. at 1304 n.8. There are eight other community property states: Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 1309. The community property system is
distinguished from the traditional common law in its concept of a shared economic marital unit in which both
spouses equally own the marital property. Id. The eight other community property states follow a
replacement analysis in their classification and treatment of personal injury damages with the result that the
damages are classified in part as community property and in part as the separate property of the injured
spouse. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2344 (1973 & Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.121(1) (2007);
Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207, 1213 (1984); Jurek v. Jurek, 606 P.2d 812, 815 (1980); Rogers v.
Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566, 572 (1974); Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826, 832 (1952). Wisconsin
adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act of 1983. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT 9A U.L.A. 110-58 (1998).
4. See discussion supranote 3.

5. See id.
6. See id.; infra Part Il.A.
7. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603(b) (West 2008). Upon dissolution, personal injury damages are assigned
to the injured spouse unless the interests ofjustice require otherwise, but upon such a determination, at least
one-half of the damages shall be so assigned. Id.
8. See § 2603.
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non-economic damages of pain and suffering. 9 These component parts could
readily be allocated for classification.10 Instead, the monies are classified as
community property in toto during marriage and are awarded to the injured
spouse at divorce absent proof that justice requires an alternate disposition."I
The California statute provides an ambiguous standard as to when "justice
require[s] another disposition" of the proceeds at dissolution, leaving the court
with broad discretion over the division of such monies at divorce and leaving
little predictability for spouses. 12
Although the California Family Code specifies the classification of
personal injury damages during marriage and directs their disposition at
divorce, the California Family Code fails to provide a specific classification or
distribution upon death.' 3 Thus, personal injury damages are often treated as
community property at death as within California's general community
property definition.' 4 The classification of personal injury damages at death
has a significant effect on estate tax liability and on a spouse's testamentary
control over such monies.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of California's no-fault divorce
reform, its haphazard development of community property laws, and the
problems with the current statute classifying personal injury damages as
community property during marriage and assigning those damages to the
injured spouse at divorce, unless the interests of justice require an alternate
disposition. Part II discusses the treatment and classification of personal injury
damages in the eight other community property states and also offers a brief
historical explanation of each state's community property origins. Part III
concludes that the California legislature should amend the statute to classify
personal injury damages according to a replacement analysis for division at
both divorce and death.
II. CALIFORNIA'S HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES

Historically, the California legislature's treatment of personal injury
awards for purposes of classification, as either community or separate property,
was inconsistent. Until 1957, California classified personal injury awards as
community property. 15 Separate property was defined as property owned
9.
10.
11.
12.

See discussion infra Part 1I.
See discussion infra Part 1I.
See § 2603(b).

13.

See id.

Id.

14. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004). California defines community property as "all property, real
or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in
[Califomia] .... " Id.
15. George Brunn, CaliforniaPersonalInjury DamageAwards to MarriedPersons, 13 UCLA L REV.
587 (1965-66).
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before marriage or as property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
personal injury damages fell into the category of all other property acquired
after marriage and were classified as community property. 16 Personal injury
damages were more property than personal and, thus, within the general
community property presumption. 17 Although California's community
property classification of personal injury damages conformed with the other
community property states' classifications, it was not necessarily well
grounded. Professor de Funiak commented that "[t]he frequently evident
dissatisfaction with, the frequently inadequate reasons given for the doctrine
that compensation for personal injuries to a spouse is community property lie8
in an incomplete understanding of the true principles of community property."'
Excluding gifts made to the marital community, community property
consists only of property acquired by onerous title (by labor or industry of the
spouses) or property acquired in exchange for community property (acquired
itself by onerous title). 19 It is plainly evident that a right of action for injuries to
person, reputation, property, or the like, or the compensation received
therefrom, is not property acquired by onerous title.2 °
The distinction between assets acquired by onerous title that are
community property and those acquired by lucrative title that are separate
property is a remnant of the Spanish community property system. 2' The
Spanish community property system was first codified in the Fuero Juzgo of
693 A.D., which became the general law of Spain superseding the prior laws of
the Romans and the Goths.22 Spain retained the Visigoth's community
property system by recognizing that property acquired through either spouse's
labor was equally owned by both spouses.23 This distinction between onerous
16. Id.
17. See Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 319 (1949).
18. William Q. de Funiak, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 82, at 225 (1943) [hereinafter de
Funiak, Ist ed.].
19. See id. at 225-26.
20. Id. at 226.
21. See William Q. de Funiak & Michael J. Vaughn, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 62, at
127-28 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter de Funiak, 2d ed.].
22. RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE UNDER
THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM: ADAPTED TO THE STATUTES AND DECISIONS OF LOUISIANA,
TEXAS, CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, WASHINGTON, IDAHO, ARIZONA, AND NEW MEXICO § 1, at 7 (1895). "The
Fuero Juzgo became the general law of Spain and superseded all prior systems by which Romans or Goths
had been previously governed, and notwithstanding the changes attending various revolutions this Visigothic
code retains its influence to-day, and still governs wherever the Spanish civil law has found a lodgment." Id.
23. See Joshua Aaron Gamer, Who is Looking Outfor the Community? Piercingthe CorporateVeil in
Neibaur v. Neibaur, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 565, 573 (2005):
Although the community system originated with the Visigoths, the American community system
is based on Spanish community property law. Under the Spanish system, the characterization of
property as community included all income or gains acquired due to the labor or industry ofeither
spouse during marriage. The consequence ofthis rule provides each spouse with a vested one-half
interest in all that was acquired, gained, or otherwise realized during the marriage as a result ofthe
labor or industry of either spouse.
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title and lucrative title still exists in California's definition of community
property: property acquired by donative transfers are not community property
and are classified as the separate property of the donee spouse. Although a
personal injury recovery is not necessarily the product of a spouse's labor, the
recovery is neither the result of a donative transfer nor readily deemed acquired
by lucrative title.
Moreover, the classification of personal injury damages as community
property created problems when one spouse suffered an injury caused by the
negligence of a third party and the injured party's spouse because classification
of the recovery as community property could permit the negligent spouse to
profit from the tort.25 California corrected this problem through the doctrine of
imputed negligence by barring any recovery to the tortfeasor spouse.2 6 The
doctrine of imputed negligence, however, was resoundingly criticized as
putting a spouse in a worse position than a friend or acquaintance by
committing a real injustice-denying an innocent person recovery because of
the wrong of another.27
The classification of personal injury recoveries as wholly community
property also created complications of division at divorce and death. Under
California's Probate Code, each spouse has testamentary control over one-half
of each community property asset.28 At death, the non-injured spouse could
testamentarily dispose of one-half of the personal injury award to a beneficiary
other than the injured spouse, effectively reducing the funds available for the
injured spouse's future medical and economic needs.29 At divorce, California
in a loss
mandates an equal division of the community property, which results
30
of one-half of the personal injury damages for the injured spouse.
Over time, all of the community states eventually rejected the community
property classification of personal injury recoveries and re-examined the
nature of these monies.31 In 1957, the California legislature joined this trend
and re-classified personal injury recoveries as the separate property of the

24.

See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a) (West 2004). "Separate property of a married person includes all of

the following: (1) All property owned by the person before marriage. (2) All property acquired by the person

after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. (3) The rents, issues, and profits of the property described
in this section." Id.
25.

See generallyNovov.Hotel Del Rio, 141 Cal. App. 2d 304, 307-08 (1956) (explaining that the rule

precluding recovery by the community of damages for a wife's injury when the husband is guilty of
contributory negligence is based on the doctrine of the law's aversion to unjust enrichment).
26.

See Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 457, § 6; Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155 (1979) (explaining

that California abolished the doctrine of contributory imputed negligence in 1968).
27.

See Brunn, supranote 15, at 588.

28. CAL. PROB. CODE § 100(a) (West 2002). "Upon death of a married person, one-half of the
community property belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half belongs to the decedent." Id.; see also
id. § 6101 (West 1991).
29. § 100(a).

30.

CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004).

31. See Pamela George, Whose Injury? Whose Property? The Characterizationof PersonalInjury
Settlements Upon Dissolution of Marriagein Community PropertyStates, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 588 (1996).
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injured spouse. 32 One of the primary objectives of the re-classification was to
abolish the doctrine of imputed negligence between spouses.33 However, the
change in classification of personal injury damages from community property
to entirely the34 separate property of the injured spouse was not without
consequences.
Although this change in classification recognized the personal nature of
the award, it failed to take into account the property aspect. For example,
because earnings during marriage are classified as community property,
compensation paid for lost wages during marriage would otherwise be
classified as community property. The classification of personal injury monies
as separate property also meant that the injured spouse retained sole
testamentary control over those monies under the California Probate Code,
which could deprive the surviving spouse of a substantial asset and the sole
means of support.35 One California judge referred to the change in
36
classification as formalistic and "creat[ing] more problems than it solves.
Recognizing the shortfalls of classifying personal injury proceeds as
separate property, the California legislature revised the law in 1968 following a
study and recommendation by the California Law Revision Committee.37
Current law reflects the 1968 change, which attempted to effect a compromise
solution to the prior classification problems.38 Personal injury damages are
now classified as community property if the cause of action arose during
marriage. 39 At dissolution, the damages are treated as separate property and
awarded to the injured spouse, unless the interests ofjustice require otherwise,
but the injured spouse always receives at least one-half of the personal injury
damages. 40 The primary objective of the statute is to provide a source of
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 163.5 (repealed 1970) (stating that "all damages, special and general" were
classified as the separate property of the injured spouse).
33. Brunn, supranote 15, at 604.
34. See discussion infra notes 35-36.
35. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6101 (West 1991). If the personal injury damages are classified as the
separate property of the injured spouse, then that spouse can bequeath all of those monies to someone other
than the surviving spouse at death. See id. If these monies are the only source of income for the surviving
spouse, then he or she may be without a means of financial support. See id.
36. Brunn, supra note 15, at 605.
37. See California Law Revision Commission, Annual Report:Recommendation Relating to Damages
for PersonalInjuries to a MarriedPerson as Separateor Community Property, CAL. LAW REVISION COM.

REP. 1385, 1389 (1967).
38. CAL. FAM. CODE § 780 (West 2004).
39. Id.:
Except as provided in Section 781 and subject to the rules of allocation set forth in Section 2603,
money and other property received or to be received by a married person in satisfaction of a
judgment for damages for personal injuries, or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or
compromise of a claim for such damages, is community property if the cause of action for the
damages arose during the marriage. Id.
40. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603:
(a) "Community estate personal injury damages" as used in this section means all money or other
property received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for the
person's personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a claim
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financial income for the injured spouse notwithstanding the needs of the noninjured spouse.4 1 The statute is designed to assure that personal injury
damages are treated as separate property upon dissolution.42
Although the California legislature attempted to improve its prior
classifications of personal injury recoveries, the current scheme remains
flawed. Section 2603 is silent as to the classification of the personal injury
monies upon the death of one of the spouses.43 If the personal injury award is
the separate property of the injured spouse at death, then he or she can
bequeath it all to a beneficiary of his or her choice to the exclusion of the noninjured spouse. 44 If the personal injury award is the sole or primary asset of the
couple, then the surviving non-injured spouse may be without other significant
financial means.4 5 On the other hand, if the personal injury award is classified
as community property and the non-injured spouse dies first, then he or she can
bequeath his or her one-half interest to a beneficiary of his choice to the
exclusion of the injured spouse.4 6 The injured spouse may need the funds to
pay for medical expenses and living expenses. Either scenario results in an
untenable and potentially unfair situation.
A. No-Fault Divorce and the Principleof Equality
California is long overdue for a change in the treatment of personal injury
damages for community property purposes. The current statute was enacted in
1968-two years prior to the 1970 enactment of no-fault divorce in
California. 47 California was the first state to adopt no-fault divorce and the
leader in the no-fault divorce revolution.48 Within five years after California
paved the path for no-fault divorce, most states provided for some form of nofor the damages, if the cause of action for the damages arose during the marriage but is not
separate property as described in Section 781, unless the money or other property has been
commingled with other assets of the community estate. (b) Community estate personal injury
damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after taking into
account the economic condition and needs of each party, the time that has elapsed since the
recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case,
determines that the interests ofjustice require another disposition. In such a case, the community
estate personal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as
the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of the damages shall be assigned to the
party who suffered the injuries.
Id.
41. Christian E. Markey & Kenneth J. Levy, Dissolutionof Marriage,California Family Law: Practice
and Procedure, § 24.11 (1978).
42. Id.
43. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West 2004).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Family Law Act, ch. 1608, 3324-25, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312.
48. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA at x (1985); see also HERBERT JACOB, SILENT
REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).
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fault divorce. 49 Today, all states provide for some form of no-fault divorcef 0
Under this no-fault system, either spouse, without consent of the other, may
obtain a divorce by asserting that irreconcilable differences or an irretrievable
breakdown caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage."'
The onset of the no-fault divorce revolution was the product of changing
social attitudes in the twentieth century and the declining role of religion in the
modern marriage. 2 During a time that emphasized individual autonomy,
women's rights, heightened protection for family privacy, and sexual
revolution, fault-based divorce quickly became an antiquated notion in the
1960's."

The no-fault movement in family law was also a result of modern
developments in tort law. 4 Legal reforms in workers' compensation laws,
extensions of strict liability for certain ultra-hazardous activities, and
automobile no-fault insurance are all examples of the imposition of legal
liability without fault. 5 No-fault divorce was particularly well-suited in
California because it was in harmony with California's principle of equality
and rule of equal division of community property at divorce.56 Fault had no
relevance in a divorce proceeding because the law generally mandated an equal
division of the community property. 7 The removal of fault as a factor in the
division of marital property has been blamed for the feminization of poverty,
the high divorce rate, negative psychological consequences for children, and
declining morals. 8 The combination of a pure, or only, no-fault divorce
49. Peter Nash Swisher, ReassessingFaultFactorsin No-FaultDivorce,31 FAM. L.Q. 269,269 (1997)
(citing Franklin E. Zimring, Forwardto DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay, eds., 1990)).
50. Doris Jones Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 514
(1990). Although Freed and Walker note that all states provide for no-fault divorce, New York retains a faultbased system without requiring a fault if the parties have agreed to a separation and have lived apart for at
least one year. Id; see also J. Herbie Di Fonzo & Ruth C. Stem, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform
Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 591 (2007) ("The conundrum remains: why does New York,
alone in the United States, retain an overwhelmingly fault-driven divorce law?"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170
(Consol. 1999).
51. See Swisher, supra note 48; see also Weitzman, supranote 47 at xv.
52. Max Rheinstein, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAw, 10-11 (1972) (referencing a
change from "Christian-conservative" ideology to an "eudemonistic-liberal" one).
53. Id.
54. Twila Perry, No-FaultDivorce and Liability Without Fault: Can FamilyLaw Learnfrom Torts?,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 59-60 (1991).
55. Id.
56. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 2004). "The respective interests of the husband and wife in
community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal interests."
Id. At divorce, the court is mandated to equally divide the community property absent an agreement to the
contrary or other legal exception. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 2550; see also In re Marriage ofJuick, 21 Cal. App.
3d 421, 427 (1971) ("[T]he fundamental objective of the Legislature with respect to the disposition of
community property upon dissolution of a marriage [under the Family Law Act] was to provide for an equal
division thereofas an additional way ofadvancing its primary no-fault philosophy... [C]learly the ideal is a
mathematically equal division.").
57. See § 2550.
58. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-FaultDivorce and the DivorceConundrwn, 1991 BYU L REV. 79 (1991):
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system and the equal division rule has led some to conclude that the California
experience with no-fault divorce cannot be applied to the majority of other
states that are mixed-fault systems-permitting a divorce on fault or no-fault
grounds. 59 And while the advent of no-fault divorce heralded a departure
from the traditional fault bases for divorce, the change continued California's
disorganized and haphazard evolution of family law jurisprudence. 60 No-fault
divorce was welcomed as a fresh and modem approach to marriage and divorce
but was implemented without a complete overhaul of the pre-existing rules on
the classification of property.6 1 One such example is the classification and
treatment of personal injury damages.62
Prior to the enactment of the current classification rules for personal
injury damages, courts applied presumptions and classification rules
"mechanically, without proper regard to the nature of the particular
63
controversy or the relationship of the particular parties involved.,
As a result, the legislature "passed corrective legislation directed solely at
the immediate problem." 64 By enacting reactive, piecemeal legislation, the
legislature created classification rules which are incompatible and inconsistent
with the basic premises of the community property system.65
The award of personal injury damages to the injured spouse at divorce is
considered an exception to California's rule of equal division.66 Despite the
option of a replacement analysis for such damages, the California legislature
persisted with its unitary approach and ignored prior commentary suggesting a

[N]o-fault divorce laws have been accompanied by increased rates of divorce and significant
inequities in the economic consequences of divorce, often referred to as the "feminization of
poverty"... [I]t is apparent that the significant rise in the divorce rate in the United States did not
begin until the no-fault divorce reform movement was well-underway.
Id.at 118; see also Milton C. Regan Jr., Market DiscourseandMoral Neutrality in DivorceLaw, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 605, 607 ("In both the legal and popular imagination... no-fault divorce tends to be associated with a
decline in the use of moral discourse in family law."); Dana Milbank, No-FaultDivorce Law is Assailed in
Michigan, andDebateHeats Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at A6 (stating that David Popenoe, a sociologist
at Rutgers University, claims that children of divorce are at a much greater risk of dropping out of school,
becoming delinquents, having children out-of-wedlock, or becoming divorced themselves.).
59. See Matthew Butler, Grounds for Divorce: A Survey, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 164, 166
(2000); see also Georgia Dullea, How Women Farein No-FaultDivorce,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1985, at C 1.
60. See Butler, supranote 59, at 166 ("Nearly all of the mixed-grounds states recognize the stalwarts of
fault-based divorce: adultery, cruelty, desertion, and habitual drunkenness."); Donald C. Knutsen, California
Community Property Laws: A Pleafor Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 240, 243 (1966)
("[T]he law has developed in a haphazard and unsatisfactory fashion").
61. See Knutsen, supranote 60, at 243; supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
62. Knutsen, supranote 60, at 246-47.
63. Id. at 243.
64. Id. at 244.
65. Id.
66. In re Marriage of Saslow, 710 P.2d 346, 349 n.4 (Cal. 1985). In a divorce proceeding, the
California statute assigns community property personal injury damages to the party that sustained the injury
unless the court, in the interest of justice, disposes of the property in another fashion. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2603(b) (West 2004). "This provision represents an exception to the otherwise strict rule in California that
community property must be divided equally." In re Saslow, 710 P.2d at 349 n.4.
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replacement analysis. 67 Prior to the enactment of the current statute, the
California State Bar twice recommended that personal injury damages be
6
apportioned between community property and separate property estates. 8
Perhaps more significantly, sixty years ago the California Supreme Court
considered apportionment of personal injury damages.69 In Zaragosa v.
Craven, Justice Carter criticized the "pigeon-holing" community property
classification of personal injury in his dissent:
But when we are faced with an injury to the human body we then follow the
law blindly, letter for letter, and declare that this money, given to
compensate for pain, suffering and disfigurement, does not come to the
particular spouse by "gift, bequest, devise, or descent,"
so therefore it must
70
be community! After all, what else could it be?
Justice Carter continued to argue for an apportionment of personal injury
damages in at least two later California Supreme Court opinions, but his
position was never adopted by a majority of the California court. 71 In fact, in
the Washington decision, Justice Traynor, while writing for the majority,
acknowledged the apportionment rule as perhaps justified but then rejected it:
"[a] rule permitting apportionment of the damages as suggested, however, has
never been adopted in this state, and in the absence thereof, treating the entire
cause of action as community property protects the community interest in the
elements that clearly should belong to it."' 72 Justice Traynor's protection of the
community estate, however, comes at the price of excluding those portions of a
personal injury award, such as pain and suffering, that more appropriately
belong to the separate property estate.73
B. Problems with the CurrentCaliforniaLaw
Although the California judiciary and the California legislature had
opportunities to apportion personal injury damages and adopt a replacement
analysis for personal injury awards, both failed to do so. These failures led to
three significant problems in the present statute: (1)judicial interpretation as to
67. See supra text accompanying notes 52-63.
68. Conference of State Bar Delegates, 30 CAL. ST. B.J. 490,499 (1955). In 1955, the California State
Bar proposed that "compensatory damages for pain, suffering and disfigurement and temporary and future
disability suffered by a married person ... be [the] separate property of injured spouse." Id. In 1959, the
State Bar proposed that "special damages recovered as reimbursement for expenditures made out of
community funds are community property but that there shall be no imputation of negligence between
husband and wife due to the community nature of such special damages." 1959 Conference Resolution and
Committee Reports: Action by Conference and Board of Governors, 35 CAL. ST.B.J. 66, 75 (1960).
69. Zaragosa v. Craven, 202 P.2d 73, 76 (Cal. 1949).
70. Id. at 78 (Carter, J., dissenting).
71. See Washington v. Washington, 302 P.2d 569, 572-73 (Cal. 1956) (Carter, J., concurring); Kelser v.
Pabst, 273 P.2d 257, 260-63 (Cal. 1954) (Carter, J., dissenting).
72. Washington, 302 P.2d at 571 (majority opinion).
73. Id. at 572 (Carter, J., concurring).
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when a cause of action arises under Section 5126 is in contrast to the accrual of
a cause of action for limitation periods; (2) the standards for division at divorce
leave the judiciary with too much discretion; and (3) the statute is silent as to
the classification of personal injury awards at death with potentially disastrous
estate tax consequences.7 4
1. The Cause ofAction "Arises" Per Family Code Section 2603
In California, community property is generally defined as all property
acquired during marriage except that property acquired by gift, bequest, devise,
or descent. 75 By complement, separate property is defined as all property
acquired (1) before marriage; (2) by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; and
(3) after separation.7 6 Thus, three distinct time periods emerge as critical to
classification: (1) before marriage, (2) during marriage, and (3) after
separation. 77
Section 2603 of the California Family Code provides that personal injury
damages "means all money or other property received or to be received by a
person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for the person's personal
injuries.., if the cause of action for the damages arose during marriage., 78 A
first consideration in the classification of a personal injury award at divorce is
whether the cause of action arose during marriage. 79 For purposes of
classification, a personal injury award is acquired when its related cause of
action arises.80 California courts interpret the date that a personal injury cause
of action arises as a separate and distinct date from the accrual of the cause of
action. 8 ' Although the courts' interpretation is reasonably consistent with
California's date of acquisition rule for classification, that interpretation is at
odds with the understanding of when a cause of action accrues for purposes of
the statute of limitations; the seemingly simple statutory language is a potential
trap for the unwary.

74. See discussion infra Part I.B.
75. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 770 (West 2004).
76. § 770.
77. See §§ 760, 770-71. The date of separation can be a critical fact in determining the classification of
property at divorce. § 771. Section 771 provides that "[t]he earnings and accumulations of a spouse...
while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." Id. California
courts have interpreted that the standard of "living separate and apart" requires the spouses to have come to "a
parting of the ways with no present intention of resuming marital relations, but also, more importantly,
conduct evidencing a complete andfinalbreakin the marital relationship." In re Marriage von der Nuell, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 447, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
78. § 2603(a).
79. Id.§§ 781, 2603.
80. §§ 781,2603.
81. See Klug v. Klug, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing between when a
legal malpractice cause of action arises versus accrues).

356

ESTATE PLANNING & COMMUNITY PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 1:345

California courts have long recognized that a property claim arises for
purposes of classification when the right to the interest vests. 12 The date of
vesting is deemed the date of acquisition for purposes of classification. For
example, in a will contest action, the California Court of Appeals concluded
that the cause of action arose when the decedent died: "[H]is right to contest
the will was cast upon him immediately upon the death of his son. ,,83 Because
the claimant was not married at that time, the settlement monies received after
84
marriage were properly classified as the separate property of the claimant.
In classifying employment benefits, "[p]ension rights, whether or not
vested, represent a property interest; to the extent that such rights derive from
employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to
division in a dissolution proceeding. ' '85 Thus, the classification of employment
termination benefits depends upon whether the right to such benefits arose
during marriage even if the actual benefits were paid after separation or
divorce.86
Using the date of acquisition to determine classification is consistent with
an essential California community property principle known as "the source
rule. 87 In the landmark decision George v. Ransom,88 the California Supreme
Court departed from the traditional Spanish principles of community property
and held that the rents and profits from separate property remain separate
property, even if such monies are received during marriage. 89 Rents, income,
profits, and dividends retain the same character as their source. 90 Not all of the
other community property states are in accordance with California's source
rule. 9'
Court have also utilized acquisition dates to determine the classification of
attorneys' fees and title to real property acquired through adverse possession;
82. See Vick v. Dacorsi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626, 630 n.35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). "A cause of action to
recover money damages, as well as the money recovered is a chose in action and therefore a form of personal
property." Id.
83. In re Clark's Estate, 271 P. 542, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928).
84.

See id.at 548.

85. In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Cal. 1976).
86. See In re Marriage of Frahm, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Notably, the Frahm
court rejected a replacement analysis for termination of employment benefits that other appellate courts had
utilized to characterize such benefits:
The past services or future compensation test is inapt for determining the character of the benefit,
and looking to its purpose is equally unavailing. Both focus on the wrong question; that which
motivates an employer to offer an incentive is an irrelevant consideration because "[t]he schemes
are designed for business purposes and may not have as their main concern community property
issues."
Id. at 36 (citing Inre Marriage of Gram, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
87.
88.

See Estate of Newman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860).

89. See de Funiak, 2d ed., supra note 21, at 160.
90. See Mary Moers Wenig, Increase in Value of SeparatePropertyDuring Marriage:Examination
and Proposals,23 FAM.L. Q. 301, 304 (1989) ("The principal divergence comes with respect to the 'fruits'

rule.").
91.

See id.
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classification was determined after all the elements for adverse possession were
satisfied, not when title was judicially quieted. 92 For accounts receivable and
attorneys' fees owed but not yet paid at the time of divorce, California courts
have held that such fees are community property, to the extent that the fees
were earned during marriage, even if received after separation or divorce.93
Likewise, contingent attorneys' fees earned while single but received after
marriage were classified as separate property because the fees were earned
prior to marriage. 94 As evidenced by these examples, the date of acquisition
controls the classification of the asset. 95
The date of acquisition can be tricky in the context of a personal injury
cause of action containing several elements that do not necessarily occur
simultaneously. 96 In the Klug case, the husband and wife retained the services
of attorney Christensen to create a limited partnership to protect the couple's
97
assets from possible litigation related to the husband's medical practice.
After the parties separated, the husband transferred various community assets
out of the country and into accounts under his sole control with the assistance
of attorney Christensen.98 Following the divorce, the wife filed a legal
malpractice action against attorney Christensen that settled for $346,000.99
The husband claimed that the award was community property, which the wife
disputed.' 0 0 The trial court framed the critical issues as follows: "Did the cause
of action arise during marriage or post-separation? Did the cause of action
ariseby the mere drafting of the estate planning documents or when they were
acted upon in derogation of Mrs. Klug's rights?"'' 1 The trial court then
concluded that the wife's legal malpractice action accrued after the parties
separated 02and, therefore, classified the settlement monies as her separate
property. 1
Despite the trial court's erroneous reference to the accrual date for the
wife's legal malpractice claim, the court of appeals affirmed the decision,
finding that the error was harmless because the cause of action arose after the
date of separation. 0 3 The court addressed the difference between the date of
accrual and the date a cause of action arises.'O° Because the underlying policy
considerations for statutes of limitations are distinct and different from causes
92. See Siddall v. Haight, 64 P. 410, 411 (Cal. 1901) (holding adverse possession elements satisfied
before marriage, but title quieted thereafter).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Waters v. Waters, 170 P.2d 494, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
See Crouch v. Crouch, 147 P.2d 678, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
See Waters, 170 P.2d at 497; Crouch, 147 P.2d at 681; Siddall, 64 P. at 411.
See In re Marriage of Klug, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
See id. at 330.
See id.
See id.
See id.at 331.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 334.
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of action as defined by substantive law, the date a cause of action accrues for
purposes of the statute of limitations is irrelevant to the question of when0 a5
cause of action arises for purposes of classification in the family law context.'
"The legislative goal underlying limitations statutes is to require diligent
prosecution of known claims so that legal affairs can have their necessary and
finality and predictability and so that claims can be resolved while evidence
remains reasonably available and fresh.' '0 6 The court explained that a cause of
action ordinarily accrues "upon the occurrence of the last element essential to
the cause of action," but for policy reasons, the legislature may postpone
accrual until the date of discovery. 0 7 In the family law context, for purposes
of classification as separate or community property, a cause of action arises
when all of
the elements have been established, regardless of the date of
08
discovery.'
The distinction between the accrual date and the date a cause of action
arises is subtle and not readily apparent from the statutory language classifying
personal injury damages. 0 9 The lack of harmony between the general civil
law understanding of the date of accrual and the family law interpretation of
the date a cause of action arises is a glaring example of the piecemeal
development of California family law jurisprudence." 0
2. Division of PersonalInjury Damagesat Divorce
Although personal injury damages are classified as community property if
the cause of action arose during marriage, such monies are assigned to the
injured spouse at divorce unless the interests ofjustice require otherwise. The
injured spouse, however, will always receive at least one-half of such
monies."' Section 2603(b) of the California Family Code states that the court
should take "into account the economic condition and needs of each party, the
time that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual of the
cause of action, and all other facts of the case" when deciding the amount to be
awarded.E12 The award of personal injury damages at divorce is considered an
exception to the general rule of equal division of community property at
divorce; therefore, the court may not offset the award with other property to
effect a numerical equal division between the spouses.'13

105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 18 Cal. 4th 739, 756 (1998)).
107. Id. at 334-335 (citing Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of La Habra, 25 Cal. 4th 809, 815
(2001)).
108.
109.
110.

111.
112.
113.

Id. at 334.
See id. at 331-35.

Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603(b) (West 2004).

Id.
See In re Marriage of Morris, 139 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827-28 (1983).
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Although the statutory language is necessarily broad to allow for judicial
flexibility, the language is also vague, lacks specific standards, and has the
potential to lead to anomalous results." 4 The scant number of California
appellate cases addressing the award of personal injury damages at divorce
reflects the uncertainty of the discretionary rule." 5 In all five of those reported
cases, the personal injury damages were awarded entirely to the injured
spouse. 16 In Morris v. Morris, the wife received over $42,000 for personal
injuries she suffered due to a runaway horse. 17 At divorce, the husband
sought a portion of the settlement award, and, in the alternative, an offsetting of
other property to equalize the property division. 1 8 The California Court of
Appeals affirmed the entire award to the wife, finding that the husband failed to
meet his burden of proving that the interests of justice required an alternate
disposition.' "9 The court pronounced that the husband's burden was a showing
of "exceptional circumstances" to warrant any award of the personal injury
damages to him.' 20 "The statute is designed to assure that other than in
exceptional circumstances, community property personal injury damages, or
the bulk thereof, will be awarded to the injured spouse ....
The judicial interpretation of the statute creates a significant hurdle at
divorce: the non-injured spouse bears the burden ofproving that "exceptional"
circumstances exist warranting any award of the personal injury damages to
him or her.' 22 If the legislature intended for such a high showing of
exceptional circumstances, the legislature should have included such language
in the statute. Instead, the legislature merely provided for an exception to the

114. See §2603(b).
115. Jackson v. Jackson, 212 Cal. App. 3d 479, 486-87 (1989) (awarding all uninsured motorist damages
to injured wife despite community property funds used to pay for the insurance premiums); In re Marriage of
Jacobson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 465,475 (1984) (awarding all medical malpractice damages to wife as the injured
spouse); In re Marriage of Devlin, 138 Cal. App. 3d 804, 811 (1982) (awarding all personal injury damages
from auto accident to injured husband); In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 226 (1979) (awarding
all personal injury damages held in trust to injured husband despite wife's name on trust instrument); In re
Morris, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 827-28 (awarding all personal injury settlement monies to wife injured by a
runaway horse).
116. Id.
117. Morris, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 825.
118. Id. at 824.
119. Id. at 825. ("Husband's contention that the court failed to consider the factors suggested by the
statute
and to determine that the interests of justice required a disposition other than assignment of the
settlement proceeds to wife is devoid of merit.").
120. Id. at 827.
121. Id.
122. See Timothy R. Ault, Problems with "Community Estate PersonalInjury Damages" and Their
Allocation in CaliforniaDivorce Proceedings,11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 303. Apparently, "exceptional
circumstances" must be established before the court can consider whether to award any of the personal injury
damages to non-injured spouse. Id."The quoted phrase, however, is not a test the court must use in deciding
how to allocate the award in the first instance; instead, it is part of the statutory test the court must use before
"assigning" any part of the award to the non[-] injured party, or to the community." Id.
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otherwise general rule
that personal injury damages be awarded to the injured
23
spouse at divorce. 1

Because the non-injured spouse apparently bears the burden of proving
that exceptional circumstances exist to warrant any award of the personal
injury damages, and given the court's inclination to award such monies in their
entirety to the injured spouse, the savvy non-injured spouse may pursue two
rather unpleasant options to realize an interest in such monies: (1) irretrievably
commingle the personal injury damages with other community property assets
so they cannot be distinguished at divorce, or (2) spend the personal injury
monies before divorce. 124 Either option defeats the primary purpose of the
statute, which is to provide financial security for the injured spouse and is a
trap for the unwary injured spouse who may be particularly vulnerable
following a personal injury.
3. The Classificationof PersonalInjury Damages at Death
Much academic, judicial, and legislative discussion over the years has
focused on the classification and treatment of personal injury damages,
culminating in the enactment of California Family Code Section 2603 in
1968.125 Despite the academic discourse, the California legislature failed to
specify 6the classification of such damages at death; the current statute is
2
silent. 1
Classification at death has a critical impact on the spouse's estate planning
and inheritance taxes under state and federal law. A decedent's estate includes
all property owned on the date of death, including the decedent's one-half
interest in any community property. 127 For decedents in 2008, no federal estate
taxes are owed for taxable estates less than $2 million.128 For persons who die
in 2009, the applicable exclusion increases so that no federal estate taxes are

123. CAL. FAM. CODE §2603(b) (West 2004).
124. See CAL. FAM. CODE §2603(a), n.27. The definition of "community estate personal injury
damages" specifically excludes personal injury damages that have been commingled with other community
property assets. See In re Marriage of Devlin, 138 Cal. App. 3d 804,810 (1982) ("Commingling" as used in
the statute "refers to the mixture of community property/personal injury damages with other community
property into one undistinguishable, amorphous mass.").
125. See In re Marriage of Pinto, 28 Cal. App. 3d 86 (1972). Since 1968, the California legislature has
made a few minor amendments to the statute. See id. For example, prior to 1979, the statute defined
community personal injury damages as monies actually received during the marriage. See id. The case held
that an un-liquidated claim or cause of action for personal injury damages did not constitute "community
personal injury damages" within the statute. Jackson v. Jackson, 212 Cal. App. 3d 479, 483 fn.5 (1989)
(quoting In re Pinto, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 88). The statute was amended in 1979 to include sums "received or
to be received" for personal injuries. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West 2004).
126. See § 2603.
127. I.R.C. § 2033 (2009) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
128. I.R.C. § 2010 (2009).
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owed for taxable estates less than $3.5 million. 129 The federal estate tax is
repealed for 2010 but is set to return in 2011.130
Although estate taxes may not be a serious concern for those with smaller
estates, estate taxes impact a number ofAmericans, including those who reside
in community property states. Because the value of a decedent's estate affects
the amount of potential estate tax liability, the classification of property as
community, and, therefore, owned in part by a decedent spouse, is an important
estate planning consideration. The California Family Code details the
classification and distribution of personal injury damages at divorce, but fails
3
to make any mention of the classification of such damages at death.1 1
A personal injury recovery can be the single most valuable asset in a marital
estate. The ultimate allocation or characterization of that recovery can have
far-reaching and potentially devastating results. Simply put, characterization
of a tort recovery is an issue which comes to the forefront each time a
marriage ends132in death or divorce while a fair amount of the proceeds
remain intact.
The impact of classification on a decedent's estate tax liability can be
illustrated in the hypothetical case of decedent Dan and his widow Wendy.
Dan sustained serious personal injuries that were ultimately fatal when he was
electrocuted because of a negligently installed wire at his workplace.
Dan sued the tortfeasor and recovered a $3 million personal injury
settlement. Dan died in 2009. His taxable estate includes his one-half interest
in their family home valued at $1 million, a $1 million life insurance policy,
and the personal injury settlement. If the personal injury award is classified as
community property, then Dan's gross taxable estate includes only one-half of
the settlement, bringing the total value of his estate to $3.5 million, which is
within the federal applicable exclusion and not subject to estate taxation. If the
personal injury award is classified in its entirety as Dan's separate property,
then the entire award is included in Dan's gross taxable estate, bringing the
total value to $5 million, which is in excess of the federal applicable exclusion
133
and subject to estate taxation.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Tye J. Klooster, Repeal of the Death Tax? Shoving Aside the Rhetoric to Determine
the Consequencesof the Economic Growth and Tax ReconciliationAct of2001, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 633,648.
Klooster states the following:
One of the most important aspects of the 2001 Tax Act that is not widely known, publicized or
reported is that the 2001 Tax Act 'sunsets' in 2011. Section 901 is a 'sunset provision,' which
repeals all the provisions of the 2001 Tax Act after December 31, 2010. In short, this means that
if Congress fails to take action, everything will return to the levels of 2002, or a $1 million
applicable exclusion amount and a fifty percent top marginal tax rate.
Id.
131. CAL. FAm. CODE § 2603.
132. George, supra note 31, at 589-90.
133. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2009). The simple hypothetical assumes no deductions in calculating Dan's net
taxable estate. One potential deduction is the unlimited "marital deduction," which provides that certain
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In Estate of Kirby, the widow challenged the separate property
classification of a personal injury settlement received by her late husband
because its inclusion in his estate resulted in estate tax liability. 134 Mr. Kirby
was injured in an accident in 1966 and filed a personal injury action. 135 At the
time of Mr. Kirby's injury, California classified personal injury damages as the
separate property of the injured spouse.' 36 However, Mr. Kirby did not settle
his claim or receive any damages until 1969.137 At the time of his settlement
and actual receipt of damages, California had re-classified personal injury
13
damages as community property. He died in 1970.139
The California Court of Appeals summarily rejected the widow's
argument to apply the newly enacted statute since the personal injury damages
had vested as separate property at the time of the injury. 140 "The act
reclassifying such sum as community property could not impair that right by
changing the separate property character of money paid to a spouse in
settlement of his personal injury action commenced before the effective date of
the act, even though the money was paid after that date."' 141 Kirby suggests
that personal injury damages would have been properly classified as
if Mr. Kirby's injury had arisen after the effective date of
community property
42
1
statute.
new
the
A similar conclusion was reached by the California Court of Appeals in
Estate of Hafner.143 Charles Hafner legally married Joan in 1954.144 They
resided in New York and had three daughters together. In 1957, Charles left

transfers of assets from a decedent to a surviving spouse may be deducted from the decedent's gross estate.
Id.;
see GEORGE G. BOGRET & GEORGE T. BOGRET, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 275.10, at 44561 (2d ed. 1964). One of the purposes behind the marital deduction is to achieve parity of estate tax treatment
between decedents in common law property states and those in community property states. BOGREr, supra, at
444. As stated by the authors:
repealed the community property provisions added to the Code in
[T]he Revenue Act of 1948 ...
1942 and created the "marital deduction." The effect of the 1948 law was to restore the pre-1942
federal estate tax treatment to spouses in community property states and to give spouses in
common law states a substantially equal federal estate tax advantage.
Id. at 447-48.
134. Estate of Kirby, 59 Cal. App. 3d 288 (1976).
135. Id. at 290.
136. Id. at 291 n.2 (quoting former CAL. CIv. CODE § 163.5: "[all damages, special and general,
awarded a married person in a civil action for personal injuries, are the separate property of such married
person.").
137. Id. at 290.
138. Id. at 290-91. "[T]he Legislature in 1968 amended Civ. Code § 163.5 to restore the community
property status of personal injury damages recovered during the marriage, and enacted § 169.3 to provide that
damages received after dissolution are the separate property of the injured spouse." Id.
139. Id. at 290.
140. Id. at 292.
141. Id.
142. The newly enacted statute was the former CAL. CIV. CODE § 163.5.
143. Estate of Hafner, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1393-1400 (1986).
144. Id. at 1377.
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Joan and moved to California where he met and then married Helen in 1962.145
In 1973, Charles was involved in a car accident and sustained permanent
physical injuries and brain damage. 46 He sued and recovered a $900,000
settlement. 147 In 1982, Charles died intestate survived by a legal spouse Joan, a
putative spouse Helen, and four daughters. 148 His entire estate consisted of the
remains of the personal injury settlement. 149 The California Court of Appeals
struggled with the proper distribution of the estate.150 After considering both
California intestate succession and community property laws, the court
ultimately awarded one-half of the personal injury settlement to Helen as the
putative spouse. 51
Hafner is significant because of the court's assumption that the personal
injury settlement would be classified as the marital property of the putative
spouses if there had not been a surviving legal spouse. The court could have
classified the personal injury settlement in its entirety as the decedent's
separate property and then distributed his estate accordingly. 152 Instead, the
court interpreted the general statute regarding the division of the quasi-marital
property of putative spouses and concluded that the personal injury settlement
was within its scope as marital property. 53 Applying principles of equity, the
court analyzed the estate "from the perspectives" ofboth the legal and putative
spouses. 154 From the perspective of the putative spouse, the personal injury
145. Id. at 1379. Charles and Helen attempted to marry in 1962 but were later advised by an attorney that
the marriage was not valid. See id They "re-married" in 1963. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1380.
148. Id at 1376-77. lfa marriage is void or voidable but at least one of the spouses in good faith believes
that a legal marriage exists, then the parties may be putative spouses and the property acquired during their
putative marriage deemed quasi-marital property. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West 2004). If the division
of property is in issue, then the quasi-marital property will be divided in the same manner as the community
property of a valid marriage. See id. "The principle issue presented by this case is: as between the surviving,
innocent, wife and children of a bigamous husband, and his surviving, innocent, putative spouse and their
child, who is entitled to succeed to the husband's intestate estate when that estate is, as to his surviving wife
and children, the husband's separate property and is, as to the putative spouse, quasi-marital property?"
Hafner, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1376-77.
149. Hafiner, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1380.
150. Id. at 1400.
151. Id. (holding the decedent's estate "should be awarded one-half to his putative spouse, Helen Hafiner,
and the other half to be awarded to and divided among his legal and surviving spouse, Joan, and his four
children.., in accordance with former section 221 of the Probate Code.").
152. Under the former Probate Code § 221, the intestate distribution of a decedent survived by a spouse
and two or more children would result in one-third of the decedent's separate property distributed to the
surviving spouse and two-thirds to the children. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1980). repealedby Cal.
Stats. 1983, ch. 842, § 19.
153. See Hafner, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1393. The court stated the following:
[1]f we were to look only to Civil Code section 4452, and to give it the broadest possible
construction, Charles' entire intestate estate would be treated as though it were the community
property of Charles and Helen and, pursuant to former section 201 of the Probate Code, the entire
estate would go to Helen, and Joan and the four children would receive nothing.
Id.
154. See id. at 1394. "It is clear that our statutes are not designed to provide for the unique circumstances
present in this case. When statutes are in conflict, the requirements of some being in irreconcilable opposition
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settlement was quasi-marital property. 155 From the perspective of the legal
spouse, the personal injury settlement was the decedent's separate property. 56
The court concluded by awarding one-half of the estate to the putative spouse
57
and the other one-half to the legal spouse to be shared with all four children.'
While the Hafner decision may appear fair and the court's classification of
the personal injury settlement may appear correct under the California rules,
the classification of personal injury proceeds as community property at death
raises potential problems. First, classification of personal injury damages as
community property adds to the value of a decedent's probate and taxable
estate, thereby potentially increasing probate fees and estate taxes. 158 Second,
classification of the personal injury settlement as community property can
result in the non-injured decedent spouse devising the damages to a third party.
For example, if Helen Hafner died testate leaving all her property to her
mother, Helen's mother would inherit one-half of Charles' personal injury
settlement. 159
This result could have disastrous consequences for a surviving injured
spouse who may be financially dependent on the personal injury damages to
survive, especially if there are no other assets. Certainly, the California
legislature could not intend to leave a surviving injured spouse bereft of the
very damages paid to compensate for lost wages, medical expenses, and pain
and suffering.
On the other hand, a separate property classification for personal injury
damages at death can lead to a similarly unjust result. If the injured spouse dies
first, then he or she can bequest all of the damages to a third party and deprive
the community estate of reimbursement for paid medical expenses. The
to others, only the chancellor can protect the innocent and render justice." Id.
155. See id. at 1383. "As to Helen, the entire probate estate is quasi-marital property." Id.
156. See id. The court held that from the perspective of the legal spouse, the personal injury settlement
should be classified as the decedent's separate property since the decedent and Joan were separated at the time
of the settlement. See id.
157. See id. at 1403 (Lui, P.J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority ignored California's
intestate distribution laws by failing to award the putative spouse a share in the decedent's estate since onehalf of the personal injury settlement as quasi-marital property was already owned by the putative spouse and
not a part of the estate. See id.
at 1400-05. The dissent made the following argument:
The proper legal distribution of the decedent's estate in this case should result in the surviving
putative spouse taking one-half of the decedent's entire estate pursuant to section 4452 as her
quasi-marital property. As to the remainder of the decedent's estate,.., the putative and legal
spouses should be treated equally. Therefore, under former Probate Code section 221, the proper
legal distribution of the remainder of the decedent's estate should be as follows: one-third of that
portion of the estate should be divided equally between the surviving putative and legal spouses;
the remaining two-thirds should be distributed in equal shares to the decedent's four children by
both relationships.
Id. at 1403.
158. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 10800, 10810 (West 1991 & Supp. 2009). In California, probate fees are
based upon a percentage of the decedent's gross probate estate. Id.
159. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 2002). Because each spouse has testamentary control over his or
her one-half community property, Helen Hafner could leave her one-half of the marital property to a
beneficiary other than her husband. See id.
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surviving spouse may have spent years caring for the injured spouse, may be
older, or may have difficulty re-entering the workforce.
A simple solution is to classify the personal injury damages according to
their component parts pursuant to a replacement analysis. Compensation for
lost wages earned during marriage would be classified as community property.
If the parties separate or divorce, then compensation for future lost wages
(after separation or divorce) would be classified as the separate property of the
injured spouse.' 6 Medical expenses paid by the community estate could be
61
reimbursed back to the community estate from the personal injury damages.'
Compensation for medical expenses occurring after separation or divorce
should be classified as the injured spouse's separate property because he or she
would be liable for such debt individually. 162 Damages awarded for pain and
63
suffering should also be classified as the injured spouse's separate property. 1
This classification is the conclusion that the other community property states
Apply a replacement analysis to classify personal injury
have reached:
damages. 164
I. THE CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN THE OTHER
COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES

A. Arizona
When Congress carved out Arizona from the New Mexico territory in
1863, the newly formed territorial government simply continued to follow the
community property rules in New Mexico. 165 In 1926, the Arizona Supreme
Court first considered the classification of personal injury damages and held
that such damages were community property. 66 In so ruling, the Arizona court
160. CAL. FAM. CODE § 77 1(a) (West 2004). "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the
minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other
spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." Id.
161. See §§ 2550, 2640 (West. 2004 & Supp. 2008).
162. Id. § 770.
163. Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 322 (1949) (Carter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued the
following:
The holding of the majority in this case is reminiscent of the period when a wife was a mere
chattel of her husband, possessing no rights or property not subject to his ownership or control.
The majority ignore the fact that a married woman, when wrongfully injured by a third person,
may recover damages for her disfigurement and pain and suffering, which are elements of damage
personal to her, and by no reasonable construction of our statutes can be said to constitute
community property.
Id.
164. See discussion infra Part l.
165. M.R. Kirkwood, HistoricalBackgroundand Objectives of the Law of Community Propertyin the
PacificCoastStates, 11 WASH. L. REv. 1,5 (1936). Although Arizona repudiated all of its civil laws in 1864
in favor of the English common law, the state re-adopted its civil laws in 1865. Id.
166. Pac. Constr. Co. v. Cochran, 243 P. 405, 406 (Ariz. 1926). In Cochran,husband and wife sued

their employer for personal injuries suffered by the wife when she fell into an unmarked ditch. Id. The
husband's contributory negligence was imputed to the wife since any recovery was community property. See
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cited the "Ruling Case Law Treatise" and referenced several other community
property state decisions, including California:
As a general rule, causes of action for injury to the person of either spouse
during marriage and the damages recovered therefore are community
property, and where this rule prevails contributory negligence on the part
of
16 7
the husband will defeat an action to recover for an injury to the wife.
For the next fifty-four years, the community property classification of
personal injury damages remained the rule in Arizona despite the demise of the
imputed negligence doctrine and the rise of the women's movement. In 1980,
the Arizona Supreme Court revisited the issue and, sitting en banc, reversed
the community property classification of personal injuries for married
persons. 168 The Arizona court admitted that its ruling fifty-four years earlier
was without analysis: "The rule announced in Pacific Constructionwas based
upon the general rule in community property states, particularly California.
There was no analysis in our early cases of the various component parts which
69
make up a recovery for personal injuries."'
The Arizona court criticized the unitary classification of personal injury
damages as a misunderstanding of the general community property definition
and a failure to distinguish between onerous and lucrative title. 170 The court
concluded that the personal injury damages should be apportioned in
accordance with its component parts:
In the case at issue the serious injuries to the appellant are personal to him.
In the same fashion as pointed out in Soto, the body which he brought to the
marriage is certainly his separate property. The compensation for injuries to
his personal well-being should belong to him as his separate property. Any
expenses incurred by the community for medical care and treatment and
any loss of wages resulting from the personal injury should be considered
community
in nature, and the community is entitled to recover for such
17 1
losses.

Arizona has since followed this replacement/apportionment classification
for personal injury damages.172 The Jurek court recognized that each spouse
also Jurek v. Jurek, 606 P.2d 812, 813 (1980) ("The long-standing rule in Arizona has been that a cause of
action for injury to the person of either spouse during marriage and the damages recovered therefore are
community property. The rule announced in 1926 has been followed consistently ever since.").
167. Cochran, 243 P.2d at 406.
168. Jurek, 606 P.2d at 813.
169. Id.
170. See id. "In construing community property statutes, the basic principles applicable to such property
are often ignored. The underlying distinction between onerous and lucrative titles is often overlooked." Id.
171. Id. at 814.
172. In Brumbaugh v. Pet Inc., 129 Ariz. 12, 13, 628 P.2d 49, 51 (1981), the Arizona court held that a
mother's recovery for the wrongful death of her son was her separate property ("We believe that the pain,
suffering and mental anguish which appellant has suffered as a result of her loss are injuries to her well being
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owns his or her body and that compensation for personal injuries should be
classified as the separate property of the injured spouse. 73 This line of
reasoning is similar to that of Justice Carter, who called the majority of the
California Supreme Court absurd for failing to recognize that each spouse owns
his or her own body as separate property and that compensation for personal
injuries should be classified accordingly. 74 The Arizona judiciary asserted its
authority to re-classify personal injury damages in 1980, but the California
courts are reluctant to exercise their judicial power without more specific
legislation.
B. Idaho
When Idaho became part of United States territory in 1863, its provisional
government specifically adopted legislation recognizing and continuing the
common law of England. 175 Four years later, the provisional government
rejected the common law and adopted the community property system.176 The
new community property laws were modeled after California's community
property laws:
There is little explanation why Idaho adopted the community property
system. It appears that this decision was based on several reasons; first, at that
time in history the common law was being debated as archaic, womanizing
and devoid of equality, the community property laws were more "women"
oriented than England's common law; second, the West was looking forward
to a new world, like that created in California, who had already adopted
this new law focused on a shared marital relationship: third, this law seemed

to encourage women to settle in this new frontier; and fourth, forward
thinking legislators could see taxation as the inevitable process for collecting
government revenue in the future and they saw the possibility of tax

within the contemplation of the Jurekcourt and thus, any award she recovers for these injuries is her separate
property.") In Brumbaugh,a father driving in the scope of his employment resulted in the death ofhis minor
son. Id.at 13, 50. The mother sued Pet Inc. claiming that the father's negligence occurred within the scope of
his employment and Pet Inc. was liable for the accident. Id.
173. Jurek, 606 P.2d at 814.
174. Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 323 (1949) (Carter, J., dissenting). The dissent stated the
following:
As an illustration ofjust how absurd this attitude is, one need only note that property owned by
either spouse before marriageis considered his or her separate property. And yet, when the
undeniably separate property of the wife's person is disfigured, or she suffers pain because of an
injury to that property, any damages recovered are community property.
Id.
175. See Gary R. Stenzel & Jeff Banks, Defunct Marriage:Its Possible Application in IdahoDivorce
Law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 725, 741 (1994) (quoting an announcement from the Idaho territorial government that
"the common law of England and principles of equity, not modified by the statutes of Iowa or of this
government, and not incompatible with its principles, shall constitute a part of the law of the land.").
176. See W.J. Brockelbank, THE COMMUNrrY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 14 (1962).
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advantages77with a system that split ownership of property and clarified its
character. 1
Idaho was slow to develop its community property laws in part due to its
common law roots and to an atmosphere of "male chauvinism and victorian
concepts of chivalry, that appeared to never gain an insight into the proper
78
application of this new more egalitarian system of community property law."'
Despite this beginning, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the in toto
79
classification ofpersonal injuries in 1975 in Rogers v. Yellowstone ParkCo. 1
In Rogers, a wife sued her husband's employer for personal injuries resulting
from her husband's negligent driving of his employer's car.180 The employer
argued that the wife's action was barred because any recovery would be
community property and inure to the husband's benefit.•18 The Idaho Supreme
Court rejected the doctrine of interspousal immunity and, more importantly,
adopted a "nature of the right" analysis for classifying personal injury damages:
We now come to the critical issue concerning the nature of the interest
which appellant by this action seeks to protect. If one relies on the cases
previously cited by respondent involving tort claims against third party tortfeasors, it is clear that there is only one answer, i.e., appellant's recovery for
damages suffered in the automobile accident would be community
property and this present action would be barred. However, without
exception none of those cases considered the character of the right harmed
for which the damages were sought.
...
[W]e believe the correct concept is first to consider the nature of the
right or interest invaded or harmed by the negligence of a defendant, and
based on a determination of the nature of this right, then to characterize the
damages recovered in relation to the right violated. Thus, the character of
any judgment in this type of case as separate or
community would take its
182
character from the nature of the right violated.

Citing a Washington decision setting forth the proper classification for
the component parts of a personal injury award, the Idaho Supreme Court
177.

Stenzel & Banks, supra note 175 at 741-42; see also Kelly M. Cannon, Beyond the "Black Hole"-

A Historical Perspective on Understanding the Non-Legislative History of Washington's Community

PropertyLaw, 39GONz. L.REv. 7, 17 (2003-2004) ("The territory of Idaho, like Washington, abandoned the
common law with respect to marital property rights and instituted a community property system in its place.
There is no explicit explanation for the decision of Idaho, but, again, it is clear that the California law of 1850
served as the model.").
178. Stenzel & Banks, supra note 175 at 744.
179. See Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566, 576 (1974).
180. See id. at 567. The defendant employer had given permission for the wife and infant son to be in the
car for a business trip from San Francisco to Yellowstone Park. Id. The husband fell asleep at the wheel
while driving and caused the car to leave the highway. Id. Wife claimed $4,200 in medical expenses,
$10,000 in future medical expenses, and $50,000 for pain and suffering. Id.
181. Id. at 568.
182. Id. at 570.
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adopted the following formula: (1) special damages are community property
because they are a community liability; (2) loss of future earnings which would
otherwise be classified as community property are one-half recoverable by the
injured spouse as separate property; and (3) damages for pain and suffering
83
and emotional distress are the separate property of the injured spouse. 1
The Idaho court's nature of the right approach is simply a replacement
analysis and classifies the damages as it would the property it replaces. This
approach was again followed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1981 to classify
the component parts of a workers compensation award at divorce.' 84 Thus,
compensation for past lost earning capacity during marriage was community
property, but after divorce, the portion of the award replacing future lost
185
earning capacity would be the separate property of the injured spouse.
Whether called a nature of the right approach or a replacement analysis, the
logic is identical: personal injury damages should not be classified in toto, but
instead according to their component parts.
C. Louisiana
The state of Louisiana has a rich history with roots in French, Spanish,
and Roman law. 186 Although much of Louisiana's family law is based upon
Roman law, its community property system descends directly from Spanish
law. i8 7 Dating back to 1808, Louisiana's community property system is the
oldest among the nine community property states.188
One of the basic tenets of a community property regime is the recognition
that each spouse contributes to the success of the marital partnership and,

183. Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 777 (Wash. 1972), overruledby Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207
(Wash. 1984); see Rogers, 539 P.2d at 572.
184. Cook v. Cook, 637 P.2d 799 (Idaho 1981) (California does not treat workers compensation awards
in the same manner as personal injury damages for purposes of classification as community property or
separate property.); see In re Marriage of Fisk, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1698, 1701 (1992).
185. Cook; 637 P.2d at 802. The Cook court stated the following:
[S]ince workmen's compensation is paid to make good the impairment or loss of an individual's
future capacity to earn, the community cannot lay claim to the whole of the benefit where it
compensates for a period of disability which extends beyond the time of divorce. To hold
otherwise would result in the deprivation of an individual's basic source of financial security. The
dispositive question in classifying workmen's compensation benefits as community or separate
property, therefore, is not whether the right to receive benefits vested during marriage, but rather
to what extent the award compensates for loss of earning capacity during marriage.
Id.
186. See Dane S. Ciolino, Why CopyrightsAre Not Community Property,60 LA. L. REV. 127,131 (1999);
see also Cannon, supra note 177, at 10-11.
187. See Cannon, supra note, 177 at 9-11.
188. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997) (citing de Funiak 1st ed., supranote 18, at 85-89). "The
community property regime in Louisiana dates from 1808 when the territorial legislature of Orleans drafted a
civil code which adopted Spanish principles of community property." Id.
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therefore, shares equally in the ownership of marital property. 189 Addressing
the possible preemption of Louisiana's community property laws by the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the
United States Supreme Court recognized that the community property system
is "more than a property regime," because it represents "a commitment to the
equality of husband and wife and reflects the real partnership inherent in the
marital relationship."' 90 Despite this settled principle of equality, for many
years Louisiana adhered to a "head and master" rule, which placed the husband
as the sole manager of the community property.'19 The head and master rule
gave rise to procedural complexities because the husband was a necessary party
litigant for all claims inuring to the benefit of the community.1 92 This
procedural rule was consistent with the archaic non-legal status of married
women and worked with the pre-1902
rule classifying a wife's personal injury
93
1
property.
community
as
claim
After 1902, Louisiana changed the classification of the wife's personal
injury claim to her separate property but retained a community property
classification for the husband's personal injury claim. 194 Louisiana's gender
specific rule regarding the classification of personal injury damages created
procedural and substantive anomalies: only the wife had standing to sue for her
personal injuries but only the husband, as the head and master, could sue for
any recovery owed to the community. 95 Recovery to the community included
96
recovery for the loss of "services as a housewife."'
Recovery also included
97
spouse.'
either
for
expenses
claims for medical
McConnell v. Travelers Indemnity Company is an example of the
procedural problems created by Louisiana's gender specific classification of
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 9.1, cmt. (b) ("The prevailing view of marriage is that it is
an economic partnership, which imports a goal of equalizing the marital assets. The community property
system implements this theory of marriage.").
190. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 840.
191. See de Funiak 2d ed., supranote 21, §§ 1, 7; 3 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, TREATISE ON
THE Crvw LAW, pt. i, ch. 1, § 891, at 74 (LA. ST. L. INST. trans., IIth ed. 1959) ("It is most probable that the
community system came into being in the late Middle Age, perhaps between the 8th and the 10th centuries.")
see also Kelly Kromer Boudreaux, So You've Marrieda Mismanager: The Inadequacy of Louisiana Civil
Code Article 2354, 68 LA. L. REV. 219, 224 (2007).
192. See id. at 224.
193. See Fournet v. Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 43 La. Ann. 1202, 1202 (1891). ("[Alctions for
personal injuries and wrongs to the wife should be brought in the name of the husband only, as the amount
realized, if any, falls into the community, of which he is head and master.").
194. Mead v. Mead, 442 So.2d 870, 872 (La. App. 3 Cir., 1983) ("Prior to January 1, 1980, personal
injury awards inuring to the husband were deemed community property, whereas in similar instances
involving the wife, the same was deemed her separate property."); see also McConnell v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 346 F.2d 219, 220 (1965) ("Under Louisiana community property law, the wife's claim for personal
injuries is her separate property; the husband's claim for personal injuries belongs to the community.").
195. Muse v. United States Cas. Co., 306 F.2d 30, 31 (C.A. La. 1962) ("[1]t is clearly the settled
jurisprudence of the State of Louisiana that the husband is head and master of the community, and he is its
only legal representative in suits by or against the community.").
196. Hollinquest v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 88 F. Supp. 905, 908 (D.C. La. 1950).
197. McConnell, 346 F.2d at 220.
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personal injury damages when applied with its head and master rule. 198 In
McConnell, both spouses were injured in an automobile accident. 199 The wife
sued in state court for her personal injuries, and the husband joined to recover
the monies paid for her medical expenses. 2 00 The husband then filed a new
action in federal court seeking $85,000 in damages for his personal injuries
and medical expenses. 20 1 The defendant sought a summary judgment in
federal court arguing that the husband was not permitted to split his cause of
action under Louisiana law.2 °2 To avoid this potential defense, the husband
dismissed his state court claim with prejudice.20 3 The federal court then denied
the defendant's summary judgment motion. 204 The defendant then filed a
second summary judgment motion claiming res judicata on the basis of the
husband's dismissal with prejudice in the state action.20 5 Writing for the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Wisdom acknowledged the "disastrous effects"
on the husband under these circumstances:
We are aware that the result we reach produces an anomaly. The husband
and wife may split their tort claims, but the husband's lawsuit must include
any claim for the wife's medical expenses. In effect, therefore, the parties
may twice litigate the issue of the wife's injuries. On the other hand, the
plaintiff's theory of the case would also produce an anomaly. The purpose of
the tort claims is compensation. Under Louisiana law the community of
acquets and gains suffers the injury. The plaintiffs theory would divide
community damages among several potential lawsuits. It is the Louisiana
res
community property system that causes the anomaly, not the rules of206
judicata. This Court must apply the Louisiana law as the Court finds it.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's struggle with the proper application of
the gender-specific classification of personal injury damages is best
exemplified in Chambers v. Chambers.20 7 Mr. Chambers suffered personal
injuries while working as a railroad flagman, and he filed suit seeking over $1
million.20 8 Although Mr. Chambers was married when the accident occurred,

198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 220-21.
Id.

202.
203.

Id. at 221.
Id.

204.
205.

Id.
Id.

206. Id. at 223-24. "This hard case involving, for the plaintiff,disastrous effects from splitting his cause
of action, is an invitation to make bad law. We decline the invitation." Id. at 220.
207. Chambers v. Chambers, 249 So. 2d 896, 902, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971), overruledby West
v. Ortega, 325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975). "There is a disparity in the treatment of husband and wife, but '[t]he

office ofjudges is jus dicere not jus dare, to interpret law, not make law or give law. The instant case is a
matter that addresses itself to the legislature not to the courts."' Id.
208. Id. at 897.
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he did not file the complaint until after he and his wife had separated. 209 A
settlement was reached, and the monies were paid after the divorce became
final. 210 Mrs. Chambers claimed a one-half community property interest in the
settlement. 211 In the first Chambers opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court
appeared to apportion the settlement monies by reimbursing the community
estate for paid medical expenses but affumed the trial court's classification of
the settlement as community and awarded it to the wife.21 2 In the later per
curiam opinion, the court held that the all of the personal injury damages were
community property without any apportionment for medical expenses paid by
the community estate.2 13
The Chambers decision was criticized and expressly overruled four years
later in West V. Ortega.21 4 In West, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
personal injury damages should be classified according to their component
parts: "[W]here a husband's settlement monies, acquired after dissolution of
the community, but based upon a pre-dissolution, accident-related cause of
action, compensate for both pre-dissolution and post-dissolution losses, that
portion of the settlement which compensates for post-dissolution losses falls
into the separate estate of the husband." 215
The Louisiana legislature codified the West decision, effective January 1,
1980, by amending article 2344 of the Louisiana Civil Code to cure its gender
specific classification of personal injury damages and to codify a rule of
apportionment between the separate and community property estates.216
209. Id. at 899.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at904.
213. Id. at 907. "' [A] husband's cause of action for damages resulting from a tort committed against him
while living with his wife in community is community property ....
[And] the damages received by
judgment of court or the funds received in settlement of a compromise of such cause of action are also
community property."' Id.
214. On rehearing, the McLeod court stated the following:
Our original opinion in this case was adopted and filed by this panel with considerable reluctance.
It was the feeling of the Court that the result reached was inequitable, but we felt constrained to
follow the opinion of the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Chambers ....In doing so, however,
we had serious doubt that the ultimate decree in that case actually reflected the majority view of
the Court. We held up action on the application for rehearing in view of the decision of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal in West v. Orego... and the granting of writs in that case by the
Supreme Court. It was our hope that the Chambers decision would be reconsidered by the
Supreme Court and the jurisprudence on the issue clarified.
McLeod v. McLeod, 325 So. 2d 883, 886 (La Ct. App. 1976).
215. West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242, 248-49 (La. 1975).
216. The Louisiana Civil Code states:
Damages due to personal injuries sustained during the existence of the community by a spouse are
separate property. Nevertheless, the portion ofthe damages attributable to expenses incurred by
the community as a result of the injury, or in compensation of the loss of community earnings, is
community property. If the community regime is terminated otherwise than by the death of the
injured spouse, the portion of the damages attributable to the loss of earnings that would have
accrued after termination of the community property regime is the separate property of the injured
spouse.
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Personal injury damages are now the separate property of the injured spouse,
but any recoveries for expenses paid by the community or for lost earnings are
community property. 217
D. Nevada
In 1848 by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States acquired
2 18
the territory that today comprises Arizona, Nevada, and part ofNew Mexico.
When Nevada became a state in 1864, its constitution continued the
community property system leftover from its Spanish heritage. 1 9
In 1940, Nevada became the first state to recognize the separate property
nature of personal injury damages. 220 Declining to follow California's
classification of such monies, the Nevada Supreme Court classified a wife's
recovery for personal injuries as her separate property, but also followed the
common law "head of household" rule in permitting the husband to recover for
any medical expenses paid and loss of wife's services.
The husband as head of the community sustains the same relation to the
wife as at common law, so far as the present question is concerned-he is
entitled to her services, and is liable for the expense of her care and cure, and
for the violation of these rights he should recover. But neither at common
law or by the law of community does he hold the wife's right to personal
security and should not be permitted to recover for the violation of this right.
It does not belong to him nor to the community. The wife's
physical pain and
221
suffering are not his loss nor the loss of the community.
The Nevada legislature codified the apportionment replacement rule for
the classification of personal injuries in 1975.222 The present statute provides
that damages for personal injuries and for pain and suffering are the separate
property of the injured spouse but that damages for loss of services and medical
expenses are community property.223 The Nevada rule recognizes that
LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2344 (1985); see also Chambers, 249 So. 2d at 902.
217. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2344, 1979 revision comments. Compensation for lost earnings post-

dissolution is classified as separate property but if the marriage is terminated by death, the recovery for lost
earnings is community property in the interest of the surviving spouse. See id
218. Cannon, supranote 177, at II (citing ROBERT L.MENNELL& THOMAS M. BOYKOFF, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY INANUTSHELL 14 (2d ed. 1988)).
219. Id.
220. Douglas W. Schroeder, Adding Insult to Injury: California'sCommunity PropertyClassifcationof
PersonalInjury DamageAwards-ProposedStatutory Reform, 16 W. ST.U. L. REV. 521, 530 (1989) (citing
Frederickson & Watson Const. Co. v. Boyd, 102 P.2d 627, 629 (1940)).
221. Frederickson, 102 P.2d at 628-29.
222. NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.121 (2007).
223. The Nevada Statute states the following:
When a husband and wife sue jointly, any damages awarded shall be segregated as follows: 1. If
the action is for personal injuries, damages assessed for: (a) Personal injuries and pain and
suffering, to the injured spouse as his separate property. (b) Loss of comfort and society, to the
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compensation for personal injuries belongs to the injured spouse but that lost
earnings and compensation for medical expenses should be classified as
community property because those monies replace lost community income.224
E. New Mexico
The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (the Treaty) ended a two year war
between Mexico and the United States that began over the United States'
annexation of Texas.225 Part of the Treaty's terms included the sale of certain
land, which included New Mexico, to the United States, effectively doubling
226
the territory of the United States and reducing that of Mexico's by one-half.
Contained in the Treaty was a specific promise by the United States to
"inviolably respect" the property rights of Mexicans residing in New
Mexico.227 Article VIII of the Treaty stated:
In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not
established there, shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the
heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by
contract, shall enjoy with respect to it, guaranties
equally ample as if the
228
States.
United
the
of
citizens
to
same belonged
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo did not differentiate the property
interests of men versus women. This omission left the Mexican women in New
Mexico caught between two very different marital property systems-the
common law and the civil law. 229 In 1848, married women under the common
spouse who suffers such loss. (c) Loss of services and hospital and medical expenses, to the
spouses as community property. 2. If the action is for injury to property, damages shall
be awarded according to the character of the injured property. Damages to separate property
shall be awarded to the spouse owning such property, and damages to community property shall be
awarded to the spouses as community property.
Id.
224. See id.
225. See Refugio I. Rochin, Reflections on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Border It
Established,5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 141 (1998). Some academics consider the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo as one of the most important treaties in American history. See id.
226. See Jose Angel Pescador Osuna, The War Between Mexico and the U.S.A. and the Treaty of
GuadalupeHidalgo of 1848, 5 Sw. J. L.& TRADE AM. 193, 194 (1998).
227. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, Feb. 2, 1848, reprintedin
9 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949,
791-811 (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1972).
228. Id. at 796.
229. One author characterized the confusion as follows:
While the wording of the ratified Article IX suggests that under the Treaty, Mexicans would
receive all the rights of Americans, if Mexican women were to take on the rights of American
women, it is unclear what the legal status of their property holdings would have been. The Treaty
was a document created by men, for men, and its potential impact on women was ignored."
Dana V. Kaplan, Women of the West: The Evolution of MaritalProperty Laws in the Southwestern United
States and Their Effect on Mexican-American Women, 26 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 139, 144 (2005).
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law system lacked the legal capacity to hold property, but the Spanish civil law
system recognized a married woman's equal ownership interest in marital
property. 230 Thus, Mexican women continued to hold property under Mexican
community property laws but were left to the mercy of the United States courts
in enforcement and interpretation of those rights 23
under the common law. An
example of such a case is Botiller v. Dominguez. 1
Dominga Dominguez held legal title to property under Mexican law, but
she lost that title to homesteaders in the American courts.232 Considered a test
case as to whether the United States would inviolably respect the property
rights of Mexicans as promised in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the
Supreme Court refused to enforce the treaty stating: "This court, in a class of
cases like the present, has no power to set itself up as the instrumentality for
enforcing the provisions of a treaty with a foreign nation which the government
of the United States, as a sovereign power, chooses to disregard."' 233 Ms.
Dominguez lost her land for failing to register her property with the land grants
office despite her vested rights under Mexican law. Although the United States
promised to honor the property interests of the Mexican-born citizens who
remained in the newly acquired territory, many lost their property rights within
several years.234
In 1884, New Mexico formally adopted the Spanish community property
system, which it recognized in its state constitution in 1912.235 Although New
Mexico's community property laws are now codified, their Mexican and
Spanish heritage is reflected in both judicial application and interpretation.2 36
New Mexico's community property law provides that "[p]roperty
acquired during marriage by either a husband or wife, or both, is presumed to
be community property." 237 As to the classification of personal injury damages,
the critical question is whether such monies are acquired during marriage and

230. Id. at 145 ("Women in the United States were still living under this theory of feme covert in 1848,
when the United States annexed the Mexican territories. The law deprived a married woman of the right to
own any type of property .. ");see W. S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 3:12-3:34 (1982).

231.

Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
Id. at 238.
233. Botiller, 180 U.S. at 247; see Kaplan, supra note 229, at 160.
234. Kaplan, supranote 229, at 160-61.
235. New Mexico law stated:
All property, real, personal and mixed, and choses in action, owned by any married women, or
owned or held by any woman at the time of her marriage, shall continue to be her separate
property, notwithstanding such marriage, and any married woman may, during coverture, receive,
take, hold, use and enjoy property of any and every description, and all avails ofher industry, free
from any liability of her husband on account of his debts, as fully as if she were unmarried.
232.

Act of Apr. 2, 1884, ch. 14,

§§

1-4, 1884 N.M. Laws 44; see Kaplan, supranote 229, at 156-57.

236. N.M. STAT. § 40-3-8 (1978 & Supp. 2006). "Although [New Mexico's] community property
scheme is statutory, it 'was modeled after the civil law of Spain and Mexico and those laws will be looked to
for definitions and interpretations."' Portillo v. Shappie, 97 N.M. 59, 62, 636 P.2d 878, 881 (1981) (citing
McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 201, 204 P.2d 990, 991 (1949)).
237. N.M. STAT. § 40-3-12 (1978 & 2006).
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within the community property presumption. The New Mexico Supreme
Court addressed this issue for the first time in Soto v. Vandeventer2 38 After
considering the case law in several other community property states, the New
Mexico court decided upon a narrow interpretation of the word "acquired"
consistent with the concept of onerous title:
We are persuaded that the word should be read and interpreted in the light of
the uses and purposes of community property and the establishment of
community rights; and in so reading it we doubt very much whether it
logically can be said that the Legislature used the word in the sense that it
was to be all-comprehensive. It seems more logical to conclude that the word
was used in the more restricted sense of embracing wages, salaries, earnings,
or other property acquired through the toil or talent or other productive
faculty of either spouse; that they did not have in mind compensation for
right of personal
an injury to the person which arises from the violation of the
239
security, which said right the wife brings to the marriage.
The New Mexico Supreme Court proceeded to recognize the component
portions of personal injury damages and classified them as community or
separate according to a replacement analysis. 240 Thus, personal injury damages
are the separate property of the injured spouse, but recovery for medical
expenses, lost earnings, and loss of services to the community are community
property. 24' In its opinion, the New Mexico court cited an article written by a
former California law school dean who labeled the California community

238. Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826 (1952). The court framed the issue as follows:
The questions involved have never been decided in New Mexico, but the other community
property states except Louisiana (where a statute gives the cause of action to the wife) and
Nevada (where the cause of action and the judgment for the injury, pain and suffering is held by
judicial decision to belong to the wife) hold the cause of action, as well as the judgment for such
injury, is property, and as such falls into the community as 'other property' under identical or
practically identical statutes as are quoted above.
Id. at 827.
239. Id. at 828-29.
240. See id. at 832-33.
241. See id. The court stated:
[W]e hold the cause of action for the personal injury to the wife, and for the resultant pain and
suffering, belongs to the wife, and that the judgment and its proceeds are her separate property.
She brought her body to the marriage and on its dissolution is entitled to take it away; she is
similarly entitled to compensation from one who has wrongfully violated her right to personal
security.
The cause of action for the damages to the community for medical expenses, loss of services to
the community, as well as loss of earnings, if any, of the wife still belongs to the community,
and the husband as its head is the proper party to bring such an action against one who wrongfully
injures the wife.
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property classification
of personal injury damages as "utter nonsense" and
, 242

"absurd.

F. Texas
When Texas became the twenty-eighth state in 1845, it continued the
Spanish-Mexican community property system in its state constitution.243
Despite amendments to the Texas Constitution since 1845, the constitutional
definition of community property remains virtually unchanged. Article XVI,
Section 15 of the Texas constitution provides:
All property, both real or personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before
marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the
separate property of that spouse; and laws shall be passed more clearly
defining the rights of the spouses, in relation to separate and community
property.... 244
According to the rule of "implied exclusion," anything not specifically
delineated as separate property is, by exclusion, community property.245
Early cases appear to classify personal injury damages as community
property because such monies were not otherwise acquired by lucrative title. In
Ezell v. Dodson, the wife brought suit complaining of an assault and battery.246
The Texas Supreme Court held that the claim was community property and
dismissed the suit because the husband was a necessary party plaintiff and had
refused to join in the lawsuit.24 7 Notably, the court's dismissal rested upon its
classification of the personal injury claim as community property. "Of course
such property as is derived by reason of a personal trespass committed upon
her falls under neither of these heads of gift, devise or descent, and necessarily
forms part of the acquits and gains of the marital partnership. 24 8 Three years
later, the Texas Supreme Court created an exception to the community property
classification in Nickerson v. Nickerson by classifying a wife's personal injury
242. Id.at 829; Orrin K. McMurray, Comment on Recent Cases: Statute ofLimitations: Marriageas a
Disability:Right of Wife to Sue Alone for PersonalInjuries, 2 CAL. L. REV. 161, 162 (1914).
243. Aloysius A. Leopold, "Loss of EarningCapacity" Benefits in the Community PropertyJurisdictionHow Do You Figure?,30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 367, 376-77, 420 (1999). The 1845 Texas constitution provided
that "[a]ll property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, devise or, descent, shall be the separate property; and laws shall be passed more
clearly defining the rights ofthe wife' in relation to separate and community property." TEX. CONST. art. VI,
§ 19 (1845).

244.

TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

245.

Leopold, supra note 212, at 377-78 (citing Arnold v. Leonard, 273 S.W. 799, 802 (Tex. 1925)

(discussing the rule of implied exclusion)).
246. Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331, 1883 WL 9331, at *1 (Tex. 1883).
247. Id at *2. "The refusal of a husband to become a party to an ordinary suit to recover community
property would not give the wife the power to sue alone .. " Id.
248. Id.
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damages as her separate property. 249 The court affirmed the soundness of its
earlier decision classifying a wife's personal injury damages as community
property. 25° However, the court held that an exception existed when the
husband was one of the tortfeasors and the parties were separated due to the
fault of the husband.25'
In 1915 and 1925, the Texas legislature made two unsuccessful attempts
to classify personal injury damages as entirely separate property of the injured
spouse. z2552 Both statutes were struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad
because they failed to specify any apportionment for lost earnings.2 53 In 1967,
the Texas legislature amended the Texas Family Code to specifically classify
personal injury damages as the injured spouse's separate property "except any
recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage., 254 Texas's statutory
definition of separate property is nearly identical to that of California's:
property acquired before marriage and acquired by lucrative title is separate
property.255 Unlike the California statute, however, the Texas statute codifies
an apportionment of the personal injury award and replaces the community
estate with those amounts it lost because of the personal injury-lost earnings.
Although the Texas statute fails to classify medical expenses, the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Graham v. Franco and classified
recovery for medical expenses as community property by following a
replacement analysis.2 56 The court held that "[t]o the extent that the marital
partnership has incurred medical or other expenses and has lost wages, both
spouses have been damaged by the injury to the spouse; and both spouses have
a claim against the wrongdoer. The recovery, therefore, is community in

249. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281, 1886 WL 4666, at *4 (Tex. 1886).
250. Id. at *4. "In Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 33[l], it was held that damages to be recovered from a third
person for a tort committed upon a wife, by such person alone, would be community property, and we have no
doubt of the correctness of this general proposition." Id.
251. Id. The court explained the exception as follows:
The husband and wife were living separate when the injury was inflicted, and the cause of this
separation was such as to justify the wife in withdrawing from his society. Under such facts, it
may be true that she could have maintained this action, before divorce, against Matson; and that
the facts which rendered the separation from her husband justifiable, would, as to her right to the
sum to be recovered, place her in the same position in which she would have been had she been a
feme sole at the time the injury was inflicted, had her husband not been a party to it.
Id.
252. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 395-96 (Tex. 1972) (discussing the early legislation and
overruling the holding in Ezell v. Dodson).
253. See Few v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.W. 2d 424, 427 (Tex. 1971) (finding the 1915 statute
overbroad); N. Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W. 778, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927, writ ref d)
(holding the 1925 statute unconstitutional).
254. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (Vernon 2006).
255. See id. "A spouse's separate property consists of: (I) the property owned or claimed by the spouse
before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and
(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of
earning capacity during marriage." Id.
256. See Graham v. France, 488 S.W.2d 390 (1972).
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character., 257 Texas's attempts to classify personal injury damages as entirely
separate property were unconstitutional because of the failure to recompense
the community estate for its losses. Likewise, California's classification of
personal injury damages as entirely community property may be subject to
constitutional challenge.258
G. Washington
Unlike the other community property states, Washington, Idaho, and
Wisconsin do not have strong historical ties to Mexico or Spain to explain their
adoption of a community property system.259 Washington was initially part of
the Oregon Territory whose provisional government first adopted the common
law of Iowa in 1843.26° In 1853, Congress carved out the Washington Territory
and provided that the laws previously in place in Oregon would simply
continue to be in effect.261 In 1869, the provisional government of Washington
abruptly repudiated the common law and adopted the community property
system.262 Little evidence exists as to why the community property system was
chosen, but the two principal reasons appear to be the large influx of
Californians who moved into Washington and the desire to attract more
women into the state.
Based on what little information there is regarding the lack of women in
Washington Territory, it is clear that the bachelors of the territory were
interested in a certain kind of woman. The conditions of frontier life
meant that a woman had to be willing and capable to perform hard work
and to live in difficult circumstances. The community property system gave
more rights to women and was more likely to attract the strong-minded and
adventurous women needed on the West Coast. In fact, it has been asserted
that the continuation of the doctrine of community property in the Pacific
Northwest was due to the challenges to survival that were faced by frontier
257.
258.

Id. at 396.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 780 (West 2004). The California statute may contravene the constitution since

each spouse enters a marriage already owning his or her body parts. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 21; CAL. FAM.
CODE § 780. Article 1, Section 21 of the California Constitution provides that "Property owned before
marriage or acquired during marriage by gifr, will, or inheritance is separate property." CAL. CONST. art. 1,

§ 21. Also, the California legislature has specified that personal injury damages are community property if the
cause of action arises during marriage. CAL. FAm. CODE § 2603.
259.

Cannon, supra note 177, at 12 ("Washington and Idaho, however, did not have strong French,

Spanish, or Mexican traditions like the other community property states. Because of this, Washington and
Idaho are said to have copied the idea from one of the other community property jurisdictions."); see also
Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law (Revised 1985), 61 WAsH. L. REv. 13, 17 (1986)

("Community property law in the United States is principally of Spanish origin. Washington, however, has
no history of significant contact with Spanish culture, as do many of the original 'old line' community
property states.").
260.

Cannon, supra note 177, at 13-14 ("The first territorial legislature promptly adopted the Iowa

statutes of 1839 as the law of the newly-formed territory, thus continuing the common law tradition.").
261.

Id. at 14.

262.

Id.
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settlers; challenges 263
which were similar to those confronted by the Visigoths
in western Europe.
In 1869, the Washington provisional government passed its first
community property legislation titled "An Act Defining the Rights of Husband
and Wife," modeled on California's community property statute. 264 Although
over 150 years have passed, Washington's current community property statutes
have remained largely unchanged, with the exception of amendments in 1972
that specifically provided equal management for both spouses.2 65 Washington
defines community property as all property that is not otherwise separate
property "acquired after marriage or after registration of a state registered
domestic partnership.... ,266 Separate property includes property acquired
before marriage,
property acquired by donative transfer, and the rents and
267
profits thereof.
The Washington courts had an early opportunity to consider the
classification of personal injury damages for an injury caused by a third party
tortfeasor.268 In Hawkins v. FrontSt. CableRy. Co., the wife was injured while
riding as a passenger on a streetcar.2 69 The court classified the recovery as
community property, in part because of adherence to the common law rule that
only the husband had standing to sue for the wife's injuries:
But inasmuch as the right to sue for a tort which one has suffered is a chose
in action, and therefore property, in those states where, as here, all property
acquired by either spouse, otherwise than by gift, bequest, demise, or
descent, is common or community property, this chose in action is suable by
that member of the community who has the disposition of the community
270
personality.
Subsequent Washington cases followed the Hawkins rule and classified
personal injury damages as community property until 1984.271 The community
property classification rested upon the court's inability to find that a personal
injury claim fell within the definition of separate property:

263.

Id. at 17,24-25. "There is some data indicating that a significant percentage of Washington's early

settlers actually moved there from California rather than Oregon (from which Washington Territory was
created)." Id.at 24-25.
264. Id. at 15.
265.

Cross, supranote 259, at 18-19.

266. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
267. Id.§ 26.16.010.
268.

Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry. Co., 28 P. 1021 (Wash. 1892).

269. Id.
270.
271.
Marriage
& Inland

Id. at 1022.
See Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984) (overruling Hawkins, 28 P. 1021); see alsoln re
of Parsons, 622 P.2d 415 (1981); Chase v. Beard, 346 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1959); Ostheller v. Spokane
Empire R. Co., 182 P. 630 (Wash. 1919); Hammond v. Jackson, 8154 P. 1106 (Wash. 1916).
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This "waste basket" definition of community property results in property
being characterized as community unless it meets the definition of separate
property. The Washington rule is that fortuitous acquisition of damages for
personal injury by a third party tort-feasor is community property because
it does not fit within the definition of separate property.

In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court again considered the
classification of personal injury damages and reviewed cases from the
community property states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, and Texas. 3 The Washington Supreme Court noted the
community property classification of personal injury damages was "criticized
by legal commentators" and rejected by all of the community property states
with the exception of California.2 74 The court concluded that the Hawkins rule
of our community property statutes, [and]
was based "upon a too literal reading
'' 75
was wrong from the beginning. Q
H. Wisconsin

The community property origins for Wisconsin are very different from
the eight other community property states.2 76 Unlike the others, Wisconsin
became a community property state in the twentieth century and is the only
state to base its community property laws on the Uniform Marital Property
Act.277 Although Wisconsin refers to acquisitions during marriage as marital
property and individual property, Wisconsin is considered to be the last
community property state.278

Public discussions and legislative debates over marital property rights and
property distribution at death and divorce began at least twelve years prior to

272. Brown, 675 P.2d at 1210.
273. Id. at 1211-12. Wisconsin was not a community property state at the time of the Brown decision.
See id.
274. Id. at 1212. "Only California has a different rule." Id.
275. Id.
276. See Howard S.Erlanger and June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community
Property: Wisconsin's MaritalProperty Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 769 (1990).
277. See id. at 769-70. The wisconsin Marital Property Act went into effect on January 1, 1986, and was
at 769.
based upon the Uniform Marital Property Act. See id.
278. Id. As explained by Erlanger and Weisberger:
Because the Wisconsin statutes (and the Uniform Act) refer to the adoption of a marital property
system rather than a community property system, there was initially some question as to the
community property status of the Wisconsin system, especially for federal tax purposes. This
point was clarified for state law purposes by section 766.001 of the Wisconsin statutes, adopted as
part of Trailer Bill I, which states that "It is the intent of the legislature that marital property is a
form of community property." Soon after the enactment of WMPA, Internal Revenue Service
officials informally recognized that WMPA would transform Wisconsin into a community
property state.
Id. at n. 2 (citing Boykoff, Wisconsin Tax Practiceand the MaritalPropertyAct, 68 MARQ. L. REV.
424, 427 (1985)).
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the formal enactment of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act.279 The new
divorce laws, enacted in 1977, set the stage for the community property change
by recognizing marriage as a partnership. 8 0 Other reasons for the change
include the existence of community property jurisprudence in other states, the
adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, bipartisan support for the community
property model, and the lobbying efforts of influential women's groups. 28 '
Section 766.31 of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act specifies a
replacement approach for the classification of personal injury damages. The
statute classifies such monies as individual property "except for the amount of
that recovery attributable to expenses paid or otherwise satisfied from marital
property and except for the amount attributable to loss of income during
marriage. 282
One year after codifying the replacement approach for personal injury
damages, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the approach to classify a
spouse's unliquidated personal injury claim.28 3 In Richardson v. Richardson,
the plaintiff wife filed a medical malpractice suit against a physician for
personal injuries that rendered her unable to have children.28 4 While the suit
was pending, the parties divorced, necessitating a classification of the personal
injury claim for division at divorce.28 5 Curiously, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court did not consider the jurisprudence on this issue from the other
community property states.2 86 Instead, the court relied upon the reasoning in a
New Jersey case that followed a replacement analysis for the division of a
personal injury award at divorce:
As the [New Jersey] court and others have noted, compensation for loss of
bodily function, for pain and suffering and for future earnings replaces what
was lost due to a personal injury. Just as each spouse is entitled to leave the
279.
280.

Id. at 771.
Id. n.10. "Distribution of spousal property at divorce without regard to title or property ownership

during marriage follows from the conception of marriage as a partnership and attempts to recognize
homemaking and childrearing contributions as well as financial contributions." Id. (citing HERBERT JACOB,
SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1988).; KEVIN
J. GRAY, REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 22-67 (1977); Martha L. Fineman, Implementing
Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 789, 829 (1983); Judith T.
Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and
Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 69-77 (1981); Elizabeth A. Cheadle, Comment, The
Development ofSharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269, 128283 (1981)).
281. Seeid. at 771-75.

282. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West 2005). Wisconsin expanded the statute by adding the language
"and except for the amount attributable to loss of income during marriage" to the Uniform Marital Property
Act's version. See § 766.31 (f);
see Lynn F. Hendon, Classification ofPersonal Injury Awards in Divorce
Actions, 27 J.OF FAM. L. 453, 471 (1989).
283. Richardson v. Richardson, 407 N.W.2d 231 (Wis. 1987).
284. Id. at 232.

285.
286.

Id.
Id.
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marriage with his or her body, so the presumption should be that each
spouse is entitled to leave the marriage with that which is designed to replace
or compensate for a healthy body. We therefore conclude that the statutory
presumption of equal distribution should be altered with respect to certain
components of a personal injury claim. Instead of presuming equal
distribution of a personal injury claim, the court should presume that the
injured party is entitled to all of the compensation for pain, suffering, bodily
injury and future earnings. With regard to other components of a personal
injury claim, such as those that compensate for medical or other expenses
and lost earnings 287
incurred during the marriage, the court should presume
equal distribution.
As Wisconsin had only recently adopted a community property system,
the state did not experience the socio-economic changes and growing pains of
the older community property states and was able to avoid the problems of
reconciling the doctrine of imputed negligence with the community property
presumption of equal division.28 8 Likewise, the Wisconsin court did not
engage in an in-depth discussion as to the nature of personal injury claim as
property acquired by onerous or lucrative title; rather, the court simply
concluded that the personal injury claim was property within the meaning of its
marital property statute and subject to division at divorce. 289 The court further
held that a replacement analysis also applies at death so that future lost earnings
of the injured surviving spouse will be classified as the spouse's individual
property after the death of the non-injured spouse. 290 The logic and rationale of
the replacement analysis that the Wisconsin legislature and judiciary so readily
adopted and applied has eluded the California legislature and judiciary for
more than forty years.
IV. CONCLUSION

Califomia's community property jurisprudence once had a significant
influence in those states choosing a community property system. However,
California's community property rules have developed haphazardly in response
to specific problems without an overhaul of the entire system of rules and case
law.

287. Id. at 233-35.
288. See discussion supraPart II.
289. Richardson, 407 N.W.2d at 234. ("Mrs. Richardson fails to offer a definition of property, a rationale
or relevant precedent justifying the exclusion of a claim for personal injury from the concept of 'property'
under section 767.255. Accordingly we conclude that a claim for personal injury is property subject to
division under section 767.255.").
290. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (7m) (West 2009). "To the extent that marital property includes damages
for loss of future income arising from a personal injury claim of a surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is
entitled to receive as individual property that portion of the award that represents an income substitute after
the death of the other spouse." Id.
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One such example is California's mechanistic classification of personal
injury damages. California classifies damages in their entirety as community
property during marriage, awards them to the injured spouse at divorce absent
"exceptional circumstances" to the contrary, and treats them as community
property upon the death of either spouse. 29' This unitary approach fails to
protect the injured spouse during marriage or at death and can be patently
unfair to the non-injured spouse.
During marriage, the couple may unwittingly commingle the personal
injury damages so that segregation at divorce is impossible. Even without
commingling, an award of the personal injury damages entirely to the injured
spouse is not fair to the non-injured spouse who has foregone economic
opportunities to care for the injured spouse. The community property
classification of personal injury damages at death is also potentially unfair. If
the non-injured spouse dies first, then that spouse can testamentarily dispose of
one-half of the personal injury damages to a third party, depleting the funds
available to pay for any future needs of the injured spouse.
California's community property classification of personal injury
damages should be changed to reflect the economic component parts of a
personal injury award. Whether called a replacement analysis or an analytic
approach, all other community property states, and a majority of common law
states, divide personal injury awards into their component parts and classify
them accordingly at divorce and at death.292 A breakdown of a personal injury
award as compensation for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings,
loss of earning capacity, pain and suffering, and punitive damages represents a
practical and realistic assessment of the losses to the community estate and the
injured spouse.293
California's in toto classification of personal injury damages is outdated.
No-fault divorce reform, social and legal changes in the recognition of
women's rights, and modem tort law have all undergone significant
developments since California's 1968 statute that classifies personal injury
damages as community property but awards any remainder to the injured
spouse at divorce unless the interests of justice warrant otherwise. The
291. See discussion supraPart 1.B.2-3.
292. Amanda Wine, Treatment ofPersonal Injury Awards DuringDissolution ofMarriage, 20 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 155, 155-56 (2006). The author states:
A majority of courts in both community property and equitable distribution states have now
adopted the analytic approach to classification ofpersonal injury awards. This approach takes into
consideration whether the award is compensation for loss experienced by the marriage or loss
experienced by the individual and classifies each component of the award as marital or separate
property accordingly.
Id.
293. See George, supra note 31, at 614-15. Because punitive damages are intended to punish the
tortfeasor, to deter similar wrongful conduct, and "to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his
feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations" an argument can be made that such damages should be
classified as the injured spouse's separate property. Id., (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 390 (6th ed.
1990)).
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California statute fails to provide a workable and specific standard for the court
to determine when circumstances warrant any award to the non-injured spouse
at divorce. Indeed, none of the reported California cases have ever awarded
any portion to a non-injured spouse at divorce.294 Notably, the statute does not
require proof of exceptional circumstances to justify such an award, but this
high standard was judicially created in 1983 and has since remained the rule.295
The exceptional circumstances exception has never been met, leading one to
question whether this judicially created standard fulfills the legislature's intent
regarding the treatment of personal injury damages at divorce. While this
article is not the first to urge the California legislature and judiciary to revise its
mechanistic approach in the classification of personal injury damages, perhaps
it will be one of the last before such reform.

294. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
295. See In Re Marriage of Morris, 139 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).

